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222 FISHER GOVERNOR CO. 1J. SUPERIOR CoURT [53 C.2d 
[So F. No. 20299. In Bank. Dee. 8, 1959.] 
FISHER GOVERNOR COMPANY (a Corporation), Peti-
tioner, V. SUPERIOR COURT OF THE CITY AND 
COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO, Respondent; V A-
LEEN O. PRESTWICH et a1., Real Parties in Interest .. 
[1] Corporatio~Foreign Corporations-Doing Business.-Under 
Code Civ. Proc., § 411, subd. 2, authorizing service of process 
on foreign corporations that are "doing business in this State," 
the quoted words are a descriptive term that the courts have 
equated with such minimum contacts with the state that 
maintenance of the suit does not offend traditional notions of 
fair play and substantial justice, and whatever limitation it 
imposes is equivalent to that of the due process clause. 
[2] Id.-Foreign Corporations-Doing Business.-"Doing business 
in this State," within the meaning of Code Civ. Proc., § 411, 
subd. 2, is synonymous with the power of the state to subject 
foreign corporations to local process. 
[3] Id.-Foreign Corporations-Doing Business.-Although a for-
eign corporation may have sufficient contacts with a state to 
justify an assumption of jurisdiction over it to enforce causes 
of action having no relation to its activities in that state, 
more contacts are required for the assumption of such extensive 
jurisdiction than sales promotion within the state by inde-
pendent nonexclusive sales representatives. To hold other-
wise would subject any corporation that promotes the sales 
of its goods on a nationwide basis to suit anywhere in the 
United States without regard to other considerations bearing 
on the fair and orderly administration of the laws which it 
was the purpose of the due process clause to insure. 
[4] Id.-Foreign Corporations-Doing Business.-The interest of 
the state in providing a forum for its residents or in regu-
lating the business involved, the relative availability of evi-
dence and the burden of defense and prosecution in one place 
rather than another, the ease of access to an alternative forum, 
the avoidance of multiplicity of suits and conflicting adjudica-
tions, and the extent to which the cause of action arose out of 
defendant foreign corporation's local activities, are relevant 
to the inquiry whether jurisdiction may constitutionally be 
assumed against such corporation on the theory that it was 
doing business in the state. 
[1] See Cal.Jur.2d, Foreign Corporations, § 34 et seq. i Am.Jur., 
Foreign Corporations, § 360 et seq. 
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[5] Id.-Foreign Corporations-Doing Business.-In actions for 
wrongful death and personal injuries against· an Iowa cor-
poration when a gas meter and pressure reducing station ex-
ploded owing to defective equipment manufactured by such 
corporation, defendant was not doing business in this state so 
as to be amenable to process where the causes of action did not 
arise out of and were not related to defendant's activities in 
this state, but the relevant events occurred in Idaho, where· 
evidence could be produced as easily or more easily elsewhere, 
where even if plaintiffs could not secure jurisdiction over de-
fendant in Idaho, they could prosecute their actions against 
the corporation as conveniently in Iowa as in this state, and 
where there was no evidence to support plaintiffs' contention 
that jurisdiction over the corporation's codefendants could 
only be secured in California and that therefore jurisdiction 
over the corporation was justified to avoid duplicity of litiga-
tion. 
PROCEEDING in mandamus to compel the Superior Court 
of the City and County of San Francisco to enter its order 
quashing service of summons. Writ granted. 
Pelton, Gunther, Durney & Gudmundson, George W. 
Granger and Thomas N. Kearney for Petitioner. 
No appearance for Respondent. 
Carroll, Davis, Burdick & McDonough and Francis Carroll 
for Real Parties in Interest. 
TRAYNOR, J.-Petitioner Fisher Governor Company, an 
Iowa corporation, seeks a writ of mandate to compel the 
Superior Court of the City and County of San Francisco to 
enter its order quashing service of summons in three actions 
brought by plaintiffs, the real parties in interest in this pro-
ceeding. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 416.3.) The actions were 
brought to recover damages for the wrongful deaths of Lowell 
Prestwich and Donald B. Eatchel and for personal injuries 
suffered by Clifford Turner. The complaints allege that the 
injuries and deaths occurred in Kimberly, Idaho, when a gas 
meter and pressure reducing station exploded owing to de-
fective equipment manufactured by Fisher. Plaintiffs joined 
various other corporations as defendants. Fisher was served 
by making personal service in California on George R. Friede-
rich and Company, a manufacturers' agent who sells Fisher's 
products. (See Corp. Code, § 6500.) Fisher appeared ape-
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cially in each action and moved to quash the service of sum-
mons on the ground that it was not doing business in this 
state. Its motions were denied. 
[1] Code of Civil Procedure, section 411, subdivision 2, 
authorizes service of process on foreign corporations that are 
"doing business in this Stat-e." "That term is a descriptive 
one that the courts have equated with such minimum contacts 
with the state 'that the maintenance of the suit does not 
offend "traditional notions of fair play and substantial jus-
tice.'" (International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 
316 [66 S.Ot. 154, 90 L.Ed. 95, 161 A.L.R. 1057].) Whatever 
limitation it imposes is equivalent to that of the due process 
clause [2] '" [D) oing business" within the meaning of 
section 411 of the Code of Civil Procedure is synonymous 
with the power of the state to subject foreign corporations to 
local process.' (Eclipse Fuel etc. CO. Y. Superior Court, 148 
Cal.App.2d 736, 738 [307 P.2d 739] .... )" (Henry R. Jahn 
&- Son v. Superior Court, 49 Cal.2d 855, 858-859 [323 P.2d 
437]; Carl F. W. Borgward, O.M.B.H. v. Superior Court, 
51 Ca1.2d 72, 75 [330 P.2d 789] ; Cosper v. Smith &- Wesson 
Arms Co., ante, p. 77, 82 [346 P.2d 409].) 
Although Fisher's principal offices and manufacturing 
plants are in Iowa and it has no employ~es or property in 
California and has not appointed an agent to receive service 
of process here, plaintiffs contend that Fisher's sales activities 
in this state are sufficient to subject it to the jurisdiction of 
our courts even if the causes of action are not related to those 
activities. Fisher's products are sold in California through 
independent manufacturers' agents who also sell similar prod-
ucts of other manufacturers. These agents receive commis-
sions on sales made of Fisher's products and provide Fisher's 
catalogues to interested persons on request. Fisher is listed 
in telephone books at the agents' addresses and numbers. 
In Cosper v. Smith &- Wesson Arms Co., supra, ante, 
• 
p. 77, we held that essentially similar sales activities in this 
state were sufficient to sustain jurisdiction when the cause 
of action arose out of the sale in this state of a defective gun 
manufactured by Smith and Wesson that exploded injuring 
a California resident here. In the present case, the causes of 
action arose in Idaho, the defective equipment was not sold 
in this state, neither of the decedents was a California resi-
dent, and none of the plaintiffs are California residents. The 
causes of action are not related to any business done by Fisher 
here. 
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[3] Although a foreign corporation may have sufficient 
contacts with a state to justify an assumption of jurisdiction 
over it to enforce causes of action having no relation to its 
activities in that state (Perkins v. Bcnguet Mining Co., 342 
U.S. 437,445-447 [72 S.Ct. 413, 96 L.Ed. 485] ; International 
Shoe Co. v. Washington, supra, 326 U.S. 310,318; Le Vecke 
v. Griesedieck Western Brewery Co., 233 F.2d 772, 777-778; 
Koninklijke L. M. v. Superior Court, 107 Cal.App.2d 495, 
500-501 [237 P.2d 297]), more contacts are required for the 
assumption of such extensive jurisdiction than sales and sales 
promotion within the state by independent nonexclusive sales 
representatives. (LeVecke v. Griesedieck Western Brewery 
Co., supra, 233 F.2d 772, 776-777; W. H. Elliott & Sons Co. 
v. Np,odex PrOd1tCts Co., 243 F.2d 116, 122, concurring opinion; 
L. D. Reeder Contractors of Arizona v. Higgins Industries, 
265 F.2d 768,779; Kenny v. Alaska Airlines, 132 F.Supp. 838, 
852-854; see A. G. Bliss Co. v. United Carr Fastener Co. of 
Canada, 116 F.Supp. 291, 294, aff'd., 213 F.2d 541.) To 
hold otherwise would subject any corporation that promotes 
the sales of its goods on a nationwide basis to suit anywhere 
in the United States without regard to other considerations 
bearing on "the fair and orderly administration of the laws 
which it was the purpose of the due process clause to insure." 
(International Shoe Co. v. Washington, S1lpra, 326 U.S. 310, 
319; see also, L. D. Reeder Contractors of Arizona v. Higgins 
Industries, supra, 265 F.2d 768, 779.) Accordingly, we must 
look beyond defendant's sales activities in this state to deter-
mine whether jurisdiction may constitutionally be assumed. 
[ 4] The interest of the state in providing a forum for 
its residents (McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 
220, 223 [78 S.Ct. 199, 2 L.Ed.2d 223]) or in regulating the 
business involved (Travelers Health Assn. v. Virginia, 339 
U.S. 643, 647-648 [70 S.Ct. 927, 94 L.Ed. 1154]) ; the relative 
availability of evidence and the burden of defense and prose-
cution in one place rather than another (McGee v. Interna-
tional Life Ins. Co., supra, 355 U.S. 220, 223-224; Henry R. 
Jahn & Son v. Superior Court, supra, 49 Ca1.2d 855, 861-862; 
Carl F. W. Borgward, G.M.B.H. v. Superior Court, supra, 
51 Ca1.2d 72, 79; Cosper v. Smith &- Wesson Arms Co .• 
supra, ante, pp. 77, 83); the ease of access to an alterna-
tive forum (Travelers Health Assn. v. Virginia, supra, 339 
U.S. 643, 648-649) ; the avoidance of multiplicity of suits and 
conflicting adjudications (Henry R. Jahn & Son v. Superior 
Court, supra, 49 Ca1.2d 855, 862; Carl F. W. Borgward, 
Ii3 e.ld ...... 
) 
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G.M.B.H. v. Superior Court, supra, 51 Ca1.2d 72, 79; Gordon 
Armstrong Co. v. Superior Court, 160 Cal.App.2d 211, 219 
[325 P.2d 21] ; see also, Atkinson v. Superior Court, 49 Cal. 
2d 338, 347·348 [316 P.2d 960); and the extent to which 
the cause of action arose out of defendant's local activities 
(Inter'Mtional Shoe Co. v. Washingt07l, supra, 326 U.S. 310, 
319; McGee v. Inter'Mtional Life Ins. Co., supra, 355 U.S. 
220, 223; Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 251·253 [78 S.Ot. 
1228, 2 L.Ed.2d 1283); Henry B. Jahn & Son v. Superior 
Court, supra, 49 Ca1.2d 855, 860.861, and cases cited; CarZ 
F. W. Borgward, G.M.B.H. v. Superior Court, supra, 51 
Ca1.2d 72, 79; Cosper v. Smith & Wesson Arms Co., supra, 
ante, pp. 77, 83; Gordon Armstrong Co. v. Superior Court, 
supra, 160 Cal.App.2d 211, 219·220; Florence Nighti7l. 
gale School of Nursing v. Superior Court, 168 Cal.App.2d 
74, 81·83 [335 P.2d 240) ; Holtkamp v. States Marine Corp., 
165 Cal.App.2d 131, 138-139 [331 P.2d 679] ; see also Owens v. 
Superior C011rt, 52 Ca1.2d 822, 830-831 [345 P.2d 921]) 
are all relevant to this inquiry. (See 108 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 131.) 
[ 5 ] None of these considerations supports an assumption 
of jurisdiction in plaintiffs' actions. The causes of action did 
not arise out of and are not related to Fisher's activities in 
this state, and none of the relevant events occurred here. 
(CI. Jeter v. Austin Trailer Equipmen.t Co., 122 Cal.App.2d 
376,378 [265 P.2d 130).) Evidence can be produced as easily 
or more easily elsewhere, and even if plaintiffs cannot secure 
jurisdiction over Fisher in Idaho, they can prosecute their 
actions against Fisher as conveniently in Iowa as here. More-
over, although plaintiffs contend that jurisdiction over Fisher's 
codefendants can only be secured in California and that 
therefore jurisdiction over Fisher is justified to avoid a du-
plicity of litigation, there is no evidence in the record before 
us to support that contention. The relationship between Fisher 
and its codefendants and the basis of plaintiffs' actions against 
Fisher's codefendants do not appear, and there is no reason 
to assume that by supplying equipment for installation in 
Idaho, Fisher knowingly injected itself into a transaction or 
operation of its codefendants having substantial California 
contacts related to the causes of action. (See Atkinson v. 
Superior Court, supra, 49 Ca1.2d 338; cl. Hanson v. Denckla, 
supra, 357 U.S. 235, 253-254.) 
Let the peremptory writ of mandate issue as prayed. 
Gibson, C. J., Schauer, J., Spence, J., McComb, J., Peters, J., 
and White J. concurred. 
-) 
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OWNERS, ETC. VENTURA PORT DIST. 
[53 C.2d 227; 1 Cal.Rptr. 169, 347 P.2d 3051 
[L. A. No. 25674. In Bank. Dec. 9, 1959.J 
VENTURA PORT DISTRICT et al., Respondents, v. THE 
TAXPAYERS, PROPERTY OWNERS, CIT1ZENS 
AND ELECTORS OF THE VENTURA PORT DIS-
TRIC'r et al., Defendants; FLORENCE L. GREGORY, 
Appellant. 
[1] Waters-Harbors-Port Districts.-Under Harb. & Nav. Code, 
§ 6233, the establishment and legal existence of a port district 
under the Port District Act (Harb. & Nav. Code, §§ 6200-6372) 
and all legal proceedings in respect thereto are valid in every 
respect and incontestable unless proceedings denying the valid-
ity of its establishment are commenced within 60 days after 
the date of filing in the office of the secretary of state of the 
certificate of the board of supervisors canvassing and certify-
ing the results of the election on the proposed district organ-
ization. 
[2] Id.-Harbors-Port Districts.-A port district could validly 
finance the acquisition and construction of a recreational harbor 
under the Port District Act, as against the objection that the 
enterprise for which the bonds were proposed to. be issued 
contemplated and was limited to a marina or small-craft recre-
ational harbor, where, though the district's master plan and 
the economic study made by the district included in their re-
spective titles the terms "Small Craft Harbor" and "Small 
Craft Marina," no limitation was placed on access to and usc 
of the facilities contemplated othcr than such limitations as 
might be inherent in the plans and specifications themselves, 
and where use by smaller vessels engaged in commercial, as well 
as recreational, pursuits was contemplated. The fact that it 
was planned to construct a marina first did not deprive the 
district of its authority to construct it. 
[8] Id.-Harbors-Port Distriets.-A state loan obtained by the 
Ventura Port District to enable the district to purchase real 
property necessary for a harbor and marina site and for engi-
neering and construction of the marina was validated by the 
First and Second Validating Acts of 1959 (Stats. 1959, chap. 
1447, p. 3723; chap. 1448, p. 3728), sinee the definition of 
"bonds," as Sl't forth in the validating acts, encompassed the 
obligation of the district to repay the state loan from its reve-
nues. Since the state loan was incurred for payment of part 
of the cost of the marina project, the acts, in validating the 
!licK. Dig. References: [1-3,5] Waters, § 434; [4J Statutes, § 10. 
